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for the "common good" is in the ascendency. The pendulum had swung
a long way from the organic mediaeval society through the Renaissance to laissez-faire of the nineteenth century and now is returning.
The subtle encroachments of administrative regulation upon the lives
of the citizens have been growing at an accelerated rate. It would be
well to remember that a legal system shapes its society no less than
the nature of a society determines its legal system.
J. W. MIK

Deputy Minister of National Revenue v. McMillan & Bloedel (Alberni)
Ltd., [1965] S.C.R. 366.
CUSTOMS TARIFF - ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IMPLICATIONS OF CLASSIFYING IMPORTED GOODS - QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW.

The respondents purchased a Beloit 276-inch newsprint machine
with a rated mechanical speed of 2,500 feet per minute. On importation of the machine from Wisconsin, the Port Appraiser classified
the machine as being of a class or kind made in Canada and applied
Tariff item 427.1 The respondent requested that the newsprint machine
be classified
as of a class or kind not made in Canada under Tariff
2
item 427a.
The former item carried a rate of 22 % as compared with 71/
in monetary terms the difference is some $450,000.

;

The classification by the Port Appraiser was confirmed by the
Dominion Customs Appraiser and by the Deputy Minister of National
Revenue. From this decision the respondents appealed to the Tariff
Board and subsequently to the Exchequer Court of Canada. The
Deputy Minister of National Revenue appealed to the Supreme Court
of Canada.
The main issues raised in the Exchequer Court were: first, what
was the material time in determining whether the machine was or
was not of a class or kind made in Canada; secondly had the Tariff
Board erred in law in classifying the newsprint machine as it did.
The respondents argued that the material time for the purpose
of classification was the date on which the contract to purchase was
concluded. It followed, therefore, that although Dominion Engineering
Company Limited had subsequently manufactured a similar machine,
the mere willingness and ability, to manufacture at the date of contracting was irrelevant. To hold otherwise, it was contended, would
* J. W. Mik, M.A. (Toronto), LL.B. (Osgoode), is a member of the 1966
graduating class.
1 427. All machinery composed wholly or in part of iron or steel, n.o.p.,

and complete parts thereof.
2

427a. All machinery composed wholly or in part of iron or steel, n.o.p.,

of a class or kind not made in Canada, complete parts or the foregoing.
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be an error of law.3 The Supreme Court of Canada, however, decided
that the material time was the date on which the goods were imported
into Canada. At that date similar machines had been manufactured
in Canada.
The Tariff Board has interpreted the meaning of the words
"class or kind" as contained in Tariff items 427 and 427a.5 "Class
or kind", it was said, did not refer simply to a species of machinery
(e.g. power cranes) but coupled with section 6 (10) of the Customs
Tariff Act, 6 a section of general application, contemplated a further
sub-division into machinery of sufficient similarities. The argument
was that since "quantities" implied the counting of pieces of
machinery, they must be of sufficient similarity. This, and the theory
that the schedules to the Customs Tariff Act7 are comprehensive and
cover all imports, pre-suppose a reasonable degree of narrowness in
classification.
Criteria then must be developed to distinguish between goods
that appear in the same general category. This is more necessary as
all items must be classified on their entry into Canada.
The second objection of the respondent involved this question of
classification.
MacMillan & Bloedel contended that the design speed of the
machine should be conclusive of its classification as it was not only
greater than domestically produced machines but also, and more
important, determined the construction and overall design of much
of the machine.
The Exchequer Court held that the Tariff Board erred in law
by not considering the respondent's contention.8
The Tariff Board found that design speed was not commonly
recognized as a single measure by which a whole machine could be
characterized and therefore cannot be accepted as the criterion of
class or kind. The argument rejected here and in the Supreme Court
of Canada was based on the decision in Dominion Engineering Works
Ltd. v. D.M.N.R. 9 where dipper capacity alone (i.e. a single physical
characteristic) was held to be conclusive of the classification of steam
shovels. Dipper capacity affected all the specifications for the machine
and was commonly accepted for purposes of differentiating one
machine from another. A related consideration was that dipper
Sons Co. Ltd. v. John IngZis Co. Ltd. (1959), 20 D.L.R.
3 John Bertram
(2d) 577 (Ex. Ct.) where it was held that the fact that a domestic manufacturer is willing to make an article is not a criterion of whether it is of a class
or kind made in Canada.
4 S.43 Customs Act as amended by 3-4 Eliz. II, c. 32 (1955).
5 1 T.B.R. 90 (Appeal No. 272, March 18, 1953).
6 S.6(10) "For the purpose of this Act goods shall not be deemed to be
of a class or kind made or produced in Canada unless so made or produced
in substantial quantities. .
7 R.S.C. 1952, c. 60.
8 (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 496, at p. 507, per Dumoulin J.
9 [1958] S.C.R. 652.
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capacity also in large measure determined the application of the
machine.
The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the respondent's argument
without any difficulty. The Customs Act s. 45, provides for an appeal
from the Tariff Board to the Exchequer Court only upon a question
of law. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that
the Tariff Board had not erred in law. Hall J., in considering which
tariff item applied, said that "the machine in question in this action
must fall within one or other of these items according to findings
of fact". 10 Authority was found in the Dominion Engineering case"
where Judson J., in considering a similar question stated:
Where are the errors of law asserted by the appellant in this case? I
have already stated that in my opinion there was ample evidence before
the Board to justify, the finding made. This is not a case of a finding
being made in the absence of evidence. Further, I am totally unable to
discover that in making this classification the Board applied the wrong
principle or failed to apply a principle that it should have applied. The
task of the Board was to classify a piece of machinery-to determine
whether it was of a class or kind not made in Canada.
This is a task involving a finding of fact and nothing more.... I do
not think there is any error in the Board's decision but if there were,
it could only be one of fact.12
In Edwards v. Bairstow13 a finding made in the absence of
evidence was an error of law and subject to appeal. Where there is
any evidence the courts have consistently resorted to classifying the
findings of a tribunal such as the Tariff Board as a question of fact.
Edwards v. Bairstow involved a consideration of whether a certain undertaking was in the nature of a trade. Viscount Simonds
stated:
To say that a transaction is or is not an adventure in the nature of trade
is to say that it has or has not characteristics which distinguish such
an adventure. But it is a question of law, not of fact, what are those
characteristics, or, in other words, what the statutory language means.
It follows that the inference can only be regarded as an inference of
fact if it is assumed that the tribunal which makes it is rightly directed
in law what 14the characteristics are and that, I think, is the assumption
that is made.
In D.M.N.R. v. J.M.E. Fortin Inc.15 it was said that although
the Board might have reached another conclusion, they would not
have been irresistibly driven to it. Therefore, the Exchequer Court
held that there was no error in law.
In these cases the party challenging the ruling of the Tariff
Board alleges that a material consideration has been disregarded and
that this constitutes an error in law. As pointed out, only where the
decision is perverse or there was no evidence upon which a reasonable
10 [1965J S.C.R. 366, at p. 373.
11 Supra,footnote 9.
12
13
14

Supra, footnote 9, at p. 656.
[1956] A.C. 14.
Ibid., at pp. 30-31.

15 [19651 Ex. C.R. 31.
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man could arrive at such a conclusion will the courts hold that there
is an error in law.
In CanadaLift Truck Co. Ltd. v. D.M.N.R. 16 Kellock J. said:
The question of law above propounded involves at least two questions,
namely, the question as to whether or not the Tariff Board was properly
instructed in law as to the construction of the statutory items and the
further question as to whether or not there was evidence which enabled
the Board, thus instructed, to reach the conclusion it did.
While the construction of a statutory enactment is a question of law,
and the question as to whether a particular matter or thing is of such
or kind as to fall within the legal definition is a question of fact, nevertheless if it appears to the appellate court that the tribunal of fact had
acted either without any evidence or that no person, properly instructed
as to law and acting judicially, could have reached the particular deterthat a misconception
mination, the Court may proceed on the assumption
of law has been responsible for the determination. 17
Therefore, although it appears that there is no doubt that a finding without evidence would constitute an error of law and hence be
subject to appeal, there is still some question as to the exact nature
of the classifying process. The Exchequer Court in the present case
had some difficulty with it. They allowed the appeal. Rand J. in his
dissenting judgment in the Dominion Engineering case 8 thought that
by failing to consider the economic impact of the goods in question
on the industry an element material to the decision had been ignored
and that an error in law had been made.
Quite apart then from a decision made in the absence of evidence
a more fundamental problem is revealed. This is the proper characterization of the process involved in the determination of issues by
such tribunals of fact.
The problem is twofold. First, one must properly categorize the
findings of such a Board as findings of fact or findings of law. This
is significant when, as here, appeals may be taken only on questions
of law. Secondly, if there is some ground for saying that the Board's
determinations involve questions of law (here it is difficult to distinguish between a misconception as to the interpretation of a statute
and the findings) are the courts deliberately deferring to the rulings
of the Board?
The courts may consider that the provision of a right of appeal
from the decision of such a tribunal (even on questions of law) is
too broad and that the proper functioning of the Board is unduly
hindered. By treating a particular matter as a matter of fact rather
than as a matter of law a right of appeal is removed. Such a policy
may indicate a refusal to act based on sound policy judgment.
"[Questions of law and fact" are not two mutually exclusive kinds of
questions, based upon a difference in subject-matter. Matters of law grow
downwards into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach upward, without
a break, into matters of law. The knife of policy alone effects an artificial
16 (1956), 1 D.L.R. (2d) 497 (S.C.C.).
17 Ibid., at p. 498.
18 Supra, footnote 9.
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cleavage at the point where the 9 court chooses to draw the line between
public interest and private right.'
The analysis is further complicated where a word of common meaning
is itself used in a statute. In such cases judges are tempted to argue that
the application of the word involves a purely factual finding, and Is
therefore not subject to the judicial control which is appropriate to
conclusions of law.20

In the instant case a determination between the application of
tariff items 427 and 427a is not merely a question of fact; it also
entails a legal determination of the ambit of these two categories.
The area is far from clear. It would certainly aid matters if the courts

would recognize that the tribunals do decide questions of law.
THOMAS C. MARSHALL*

WILLS
MacGregor v. Ryan, [1965] S.C.R. 757.
WILLS - VALIDITY - ALLEGATION THAT TESTATRIX LACKED TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY - ALTERNATIVE ALLEGATION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE - WHETHER
SUSPICION
RAISED
BY
CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING EXECUTION OF WILL DISPELLED - ONUS OF PROOF.

In the recent case of MacGregor v. Ryan' the Supreme Court of
Canada was afforded an opportunity of authoritatively settling several
contentious issues in the law of wills. An appeal had been taken by
the caveator from the Ontario Court of Appeal judgment dismissing
an appeal from the order of the Surrogate Judge admitting the will

to probate. The caveator attacked the validity of the will on the
traditional grounds that the will was not duly executed, the testatrix
did not possess the requisite testamentary capacity, and the will was

procured by undue influence.

In the Supreme Court of Canada the first of these grounds was

abandoned, leaving the issues of testamentary capacity and undue

influence, 2 but the case is significant from a jurisprudential point of
view for its discussion of burdens and standards of proof.
The facts, as found by the learned trial judge and confirmed by

the Court of Appeal, were that the testatrix, aged ninety-one, and
confined in the hospital, told her sole remaining executor, on the
19 Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review-Questions of Law (1955-56), 69 Harv.
L. R. 239, at p. 240n, quoting from Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the
Supremacy of Law (1927), p. 55.
20 Ibid., p. 243.
* Thomas C. Marshall, B.A. (Toronto), LL.B. (Osgoode), is a member of
the 1966 graduating class.
1 [19651 S.C.R. 757, (1966), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 126.
2 Judson, J. (dissenting) views the argument of the appellant as confined
to the issue of testamentary capacity (p. 128); Ritchie, J. (for the majority)
interprets the appellant's argument as being primarily directed to the issue
of undue influence (p. 132).

